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God, Christ and Animals: Article Review of David L. Clough, On Animals: Volume 1 
Systematic Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2012) 
 
Abstract 
 
One of the most significant contributions to the field in recent times, David Clough’s work 
should ensure that theologies of creation, redemption and eschatological fulfilment give 
proper attention to animals. In a landmark study, he draws upon resources in Scripture and 
tradition to present a systematic theology that is alert to the place of animals in the divine 
economy. Amidst his relentless criticism of all forms of anthropocentrism, however, it is 
asked whether some unresolved tensions emerge in relation to the traditional doctrine of God, 
the use of the category of the ‘personal’ in theology, and the incarnation of the Word of God 
as a human creature. 
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In establishing animals as a subject of systematic theological enquiry, David Clough 
has broken new ground. No longer a marginal note or peripheral sub-topic, our fellow 
creatures are now brought into the centre of the enquiry. Here they become integral to 
the treatment of the works of God in creation, redemption and eschatological 
fulfilment.   
 
Although driven by ethical concerns, this book attempts to set out the doctrinal basis 
from which its sequel will draw when a second volume completes the project. 
Questions will inevitably arise at that stage as to whether the ethical positions he 
advocates might equally well be sustained on a different theological base, but for the 
moment it is as a work of systematic theology that this demands critical attention.  
 
Much of the discussion involves clearing away previous mistakes, particularly in 
relation to theologies which over-determine human distinctiveness and construe the 
economy of creation and salvation as principally directed to human beings and only 
derivatively to other animals. While most theologies of creation have proved capable 
of attending to the place of non-human creatures in the Hebrew Bible, much less has 
been said about how they can be included within the scope of redemption and 
reconciliation. Here Clough has much to offer. Even while engaging in robust 
criticism of the tradition he is able to draw upon a surprisingly rich array of historical 
sources in repairing and restating key elements of systematic theology. The company 
of animals has never been wholly absent from theological reflection, and by pulling 
upon some important strands in Scripture and tradition, Clough is able to develop 
striking conclusions about the ways in which each animal might be considered as 
created, redeemed and resurrected. 
 
There is much to commend in this book – it is historically alert, Scripturally informed, 
widely researched and refreshingly ambitious; though bold and forthright, it engages 
alternative positions in an even-handed and patient manner. It is also clear, accessible 
and unpretentious – qualities that all need to be recovered at the present time. The 
theological eminence who is never far from the discussion is of course Karl Barth. If 
his work seems unpromising for this kind of project – particularly his doctrine of 
election with its intense concentration upon the election of one human being – 
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nevertheless Clough is able to develop and revise Barth at key points to offer a more 
capacious account of the place of animals in theological description.  
 
On the whole, I judge this project to be worthwhile and persuasive. We shall not be 
able to ignore Clough’s work in future treatments of these doctrinal loci, and indeed 
we may soon come to recognise, if we have not already, that a major failing of past 
theologies lies in an excessive anthropocentrism which produced at times a 
lamentable blind-spot concerning the ethical status of non-human creatures. Once 
animals are acknowledged as theologically central, then several ethical issues become 
urgent and pressing. We can no longer write about the theology of creation without a 
closer and chastened attention to creatures other than the human. 
 
But there are some critical issues which I wish to raise, one methodological and the 
others substantive although I believe these not to be unrelated. The sub-title 
‘systematic theology’ may be somewhat misleading, since this is a work that nowhere 
deals with the doctrine of God. Its choice of doctrinal themes is limited largely to 
creation, the person and work of Christ, and eschatology so that it is more a series of 
explorations in selected loci than a full-blown systematic theology. There is for 
example no discussion of sources and norms, of the divine attributes and the doctrine 
of the Trinity, nor of pneumatology, ecclesiology and the sacraments.   
 
The doctrine of God is only implicit in this work, although Clough appears to be 
committed to a classical Nicene account of the Trinity and to traditional notions of 
transcendence, creatio ex nihilo, providence and divine agency. No indication is given 
that he wishes to follow other theological projects into extensive revisions of the 
traditional doctrine of God by moving towards a unitarianism of the third person, 
developing a panentheist account of the God-world relationship or of substituting 
notions of transcendence and agency for immanence and indwelling. Yet his 
commitments in this area remain largely implicit and presupposed by his alignment 
with the classical tradition, rather than argued through dedicated chapters. 
 
The result of this lacuna is that the category of the ‘personal’ is left unexplored in 
Clough’s systematic theology. The traditional doctrine of God appears committed to 
the notion that it is more correct than incorrect to attribute personal categories to God 
whether that be in terms of the three Trinitarian hypostases, the divine attributes, or 
the agency and intentionality ascribed to God in creation, redemption and 
eschatological fulfilment. While this ascription of personal terms needs to be qualified 
in important ways to generate what Kathryn Tanner has recently called mixed 
metaphors of God, nevertheless the categorial scheme of the personal is ineluctable in 
the traditional doctrine of God as the Father from whom the Word is eternally 
begotten and the Spirit proceeds – here a discourse of intelligence, purpose, agency 
and will is employed to characterise, albeit in qualified ways, the being and act of 
God. And the move from this doctrine of God to the further claim that it is created 
persons who specifically have the conceptual resources to speak of God, to worship 
God, and to narrate stories about God’s works of creation and salvation seems to 
follow quite quickly. This move does not entail that there cannot be other created 
persons in the cosmos who might do these things in different and more adequate ways 
than we do here on planet earth, nor does it imply that other creatures cannot have a 
divinely-appointed place. But I take Clough to be committed to the view that it is the 
evolutionary emergence of human persons that has facilitated a particular knowledge 
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and discourse of God which has yielded precisely those doctrines of which he writes 
in this volume. And this must be more than simply a form of perspectivalism, if we 
are to commit to the traditional correlation of the economic and the immanent Trinity 
 
One alternative would simply be to declare the traditional doctrine of God as 
unacceptably anthropomorphic or anthropocentric. David Hume once remarked that if 
we were a race of intelligent spiders we would most likely have conceived of God as a 
giant spider who had spun the universe as a great web; this would then have become 
the dominant model for articulating the God-world relationship. Yet a major revision 
of the doctrine of God is not the preferred option in this work, which immediately 
generates a strong and unresolved tension with the dismissal at the outset of all forms 
of ‘teleological anthropocentrism’ (p xx).   
 
This conjunction of tendencies is why I suspect Clough’s strategy is not so much to 
diminish the significance of the human person but to include other creatures in a story 
that is strongly personified. He claims that we stand in the same place as other 
animals before God, but he might have said with equal force that animals stand in the 
same place as we do before God. (p. 44) This generates some further queries which I 
cannot enter into fully. Suffice it to say that his robust anti-anthropocentric strategy 
when aligned with a traditional doctrine of God seems to be most successful in 
dealing with creation, plausible in relation to his eschatological proposals but rather 
less convincing in seeking to construe, or should I say ‘personify’, animals as having 
a divine vocation or as fellow sinners who are forgiven and redeemed by Christ.  
 
If we are to privilege concepts of the personal in our theological description, what 
should we say about human persons in relation to other creatures? Clough is rightly 
nervous around earlier notions that set the human being apart from other animals by 
the identification of a single ontological feature such as the soul or mind. He reminds 
us repeatedly of our genetic and dispositional continuities with other species and of 
the ways in which other animals can communicate, socialise, empathise and even be 
adjudged by moral categories. Yet on the issue of human or personal distinctiveness, I 
remain unclear. There are two positions at the opposite end of a possible spectrum of 
views. At one end, we might identify a strong anthropocentrism which claims that the 
world was created in order that there be human beings to be redeemed and raised to 
the heavenly city of God to make good the number of fallen angels. At the other end 
of the spectrum, we might view the creation as generating in non-deterministic ways 
an immense variety of species of which we happen to be one. And, on this view, if 
human creatures had not existed, the value and purpose of creation would not have 
been diminished or altered in the least. I take Clough’s position and that of most 
Christian theologians today to be mid-spectrum, but where exactly does he sit? The 
language slides from inveighing against notions that the world is primarily or only or 
exclusively (italics mine) for us. In another place, he tells us that it is more than just 
about us. These claims are held alongside the belated recognition that human beings 
may have some special function in the divine ordering of the cosmos. But this is never 
fully explicated nor is the related problem of whether Christ might have become 
incarnate in the form of another creature or whether there is something fitting rather 
than necessary (as Aquinas would say) about the assumption of human flesh by the 
Word of God.   
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On this last point, formidable problems confront the position that is seemingly 
advocated. It appears to be claimed (83–84) that the humanity of Christ is no more 
essential to the salvific efficacy of his work than for example his masculinity or his 
race. Extension of this recognizable principle leads to the claim that what was vital for 
the salvation of the world was not Christ’s assumption of humanity but of 
creaturehood. I find this difficult to interpret. Is the humanity of Christ an accidental 
feature of an incarnation that could equally well have taken place in another species? 
Is Clough claiming here that had the Word of God become enfleshed as a crocodile or 
a hippopotamus (to name two of the wonderful creatures at the heart of the Book of 
Job), it would have made little difference to the salvation of the world? This appears 
to be the implication of the assertion that the assumption of humanity is a non-
essential feature of the incarnation. If so, we then have a reductio ad absurdum of 
traditional soteriological claims. How could we have known that we were saved by 
the Word become crocodile or hippopotamus? Would there be some mysterious 
analogue of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus? What continuity remains with 
the history of Israel? How could the sacraments possess any meaning for us? I cannot 
see any prospect of handling such questions on this scenario, which in turn inclines 
me to the view that some stress on human significance will have to be upheld for the 
sake of maintaining an objective theory of the atonement. The language of ‘covenant’ 
may have some potential in this context. One might maintain a more-or-less 
traditional account of the person and work of Christ but view this not as excluding but 
as extending to other creatures. In this respect, Christ’s humanity and his creaturehood 
are both integral to a cosmic view of salvation which is sufficiently capacious to 
include all created reality. In successive chapters on incarnation and atonement this 
indeed appears to be the position that is defended by Clough, but it sits uneasily with 
the axiom that the humanity of Jesus is only incidentally related to his work in much 
the same way as his gender.  
 
In summary, I suspect that there remains at the heart of this important work an 
unresolved tension between the implicit doctrine of God, the prioritisation of personal 
categories, the traditional account of the person and work of Christ, and the resolute 
refusal of any form of anthropocentrism.  But the capacity of the book to evoke such 
questions is a measure of its scope and ambition – Clough has taken a risk in painting 
on such a broad canvas and deserves immense credit for doing so. While he 
acknowledges that he has not spoken the last word on this subject, we should be 
grateful to him for making such a substantial contribution  
 
  
 
 
 
